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I. CHANGE OF BOUNDARIES-CONSOLIDATION
W HERE citizens of two or more cities which are "adjoining and con-
tiguous" and are "in the same county"1 desire consolidation, article
1189 of the civil statutes applies, providing as follows:
Whenever as many as one hundred qualified voters of each of said cities shall
petition the governing body of their respective cities to order an election for
the purpose of voting on the consolidation of such cities into one city, said
bodies may, at their next regular meeting order an election to be held at the
usual voting places in the cities, on the same day, not less than thirty days
after such order is made. If said petitions be signed respectively, however, by
qualified electors equal to fifteen per cent of the total vote cast at the last
preceding general election for city officials in each of said cities, next preced-
ing the filing of said petitions, the respective governing bodies shall, within
ten days after the receipt thereof, order an election to be held.'
In a case of first impression under this article, a petition meeting the fif-
teen per cent requirement necessary to make mandatory the ordering of
an election was filed with the governing body of the city of Bedford with
a view to consolidation with the city of Euless. The Bedford city officials
refused to order an election, and a mandamus suit was brought by electors
of that city to compel the mayor and other city officials to issue the order.
The trial court granted mandamus over objections by the city officials, who
attempted to raise questions as to the validity of corresponding activities
in the city of Euless. A Texas court of civil appeals affirmed, holding that
"the validity and effectiveness of a petition to the governing body of one
city to order such an election would not in any way depend upon the
validity and effectiveness of a petition to the governing body of the city
with which a consolidation was proposed." ' In so holding, the court spe-
cifically noted that it was not required to determine whether an election
by only one city would be improper under the statutory provision in ques-
tion, or whether elections in the two cities must be held on the same day as
is required under the provision permitting elections to be called upon peti-
tion by "as many as one hundred qualified voters."
II. POLICE POWER
Acting under an ordinance requiring that distributors of milk within
the city "make at least three deliveries" each week, the home rule city of
Mt. Pleasant refused to renew the permit of a dairy which would not com-
* B.A., Birmingham-Southern College; M.A., LL.B., Vanderbilt University. Assistant Professor
of Law, Southern Methodist University.
'TEx. Rrv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1188 (1964).
'Id. art. 1189 (emphasis added).
3Wolf v. Petty, 414 S.W.2d 539, 541 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
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ply with the ordinance. The dairy sought a permanent injunction to pro-
hibit the city from enforcing the milk delivery ordinance, contending
that it was inconsistent with a state statute governing grading and label-
ing of milk4 and regulations promulgated thereunder. The trial court held
for the city and refused injunctive relief. The city conceded preemption
by the state in the field of grading and labeling milk, but it argued that
delivery of milk was not included in that subject and that the ordinance
complemented rather than conflicted with the state statute and regulations.
It was readily agreed by the city, however, that the purpose of the ordi-
nance was an attempt to insure distribution of fresher milk within the city.
There was evidence that prior to enactment of the ordinance in question,
tests conducted on samples of milk distributed by dairies making only two
deliveries per week showed they had a substantially higher bacterial count
than milk delivered by dairies making three deliveries a week.' Conclud-
ing that the effect of the ordinance was to impose on milk standards of
freshness not required under the state statute and regulations, a Texas
court of civil appeals held that the city had attempted to enter a field
"occupied exclusively by the state statutes and regulations" and, therefore,
was permanently enjoined from enforcing the milk delivery provisions of
the ordinance.'
In another civil appeals case,7 a Houston ordinance, prohibiting as a
"common and public nuisance" all fireworks within the jurisdiction of the
city, was held to be valid and not in conflict with a statute prohibiting the
sale or use of all fireworks except "ICC Class C Common Fireworks."' A
licensed distributor of permissible fireworks under the statute sought to
prevent enforcement of the ordinance. Citing a number of previous Texas
decisions,' the court held that the city of Houston was acting within the
constitution and laws of Texas in prohibiting all fireworks within the city
by declaring them to be a nuisance and directing summary abatement.
Turning to the statute in question, the court recognized that all of the
cases cited to uphold the ordinance had been decided prior to enactment
of the statute. However, the court pointed out that one section of the
'TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 165-3 (1964), subsequently amended with an emergency
effective date of June 18, 1967, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 165-3 (Supp. 1967).
s In fact, the city sanitarian testified that two out of three tests conducted on the "two de-
livery" milk showed a bacterial count in excess of that allowed under the state regulations. In this
regard, it should be noted tsat when the statute in question was amended (see note 4 supra), a
provision was added specifically setting out a required procedure for sampling, testing, and in-
specting Grade "A" milk and milk products. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 165-3, § 7A
(Supp. 1967).
'Jere Dairy, Inc. v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 417 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref.
ir.e. See also Prescott v. City of Borger, 158 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) error ref. Antieau
has pointed out "a noticeable inclination on the part of the courts to invalidate municipal restric-
tions involving milk and dairy products either because the state has occupied the field, or because
there is conflict with state law which permits what the municipality would forbid." 1 C. ANTIEAU,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 6.22 (1966), citing the Borger case. But he believes that the
"better cases permit municipal corporations to complement the milk regulations of the state au-
thorities." Id., citing, e.g., City of St. Louis v. Klausmeier, 213 Mo. 119, 112 S.W. 516 (1908).
7Alpha Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Houston, 411 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error
ref. n.r.e.
'TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 1725 (Supp. 1967).
OSee, e.g., Stoughton v. City of Fort Worth, 277 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955); Cannon
v. City of Dallas, 263 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) error ref. n.r.e.
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statute specifically provides that no city ordinance prohibiting fireworks,
whether enacted prior or subsequent to the statute, shall be repealed by
the act."
III. MUNICIPAL PROPERTY-TAXATION
The Texas Constitution, article 8, section 1, provides in part as follows:
Taxation shall be equal and uniform. All property in this State, whether
owned by natural persons or corporations, other than municipal, shall be taxed
in proportion to its value, which shall be ascertained as may be provided by
law."
Section 4 of article 7150 of the civil statutes provides a specific tax ex-
emption, with certain exceptions, for "all property, whether real or per-
sonal, belonging exclusively to this State, or any political subdivision
thereof."'" However, the Texas courts have consistently read into this
provision a requirement that, in order to be exempt, city-owned property
must be devoted to a public purpose.'3 This results from reading together
with the constitutional and statutory provisions cited above the following
provisions of the Texas Constitution, article 8, section 2 and article 11,
section 9:
Article 8
Sec. 2. All occupation taxes shall be equal and uniform upon the same class
of subjects within the limits of the authority levying the tax; but the legis-
lature may, by general laws, exempt from taxation public property used for
public purposes; actual places ... [of] religious worship, . . .and all laws
exempting property from taxation other than the property above mentioned
shall be null and void.'
Article 11
Sec. 9. The property of counties, cities and towns, owned and held only for
public purposes, such as public buildings and the sites therefor ... public
grounds and all other property devoted exclusively to the use and benefit of
the Public shall be exempt from . . .taxation."
All of these provisions took on renewed interest and significance in
City of Beaumont v. Fertitta.6 At issue was a lease contract made in 1928
0 Be it further enacted, that any Acts, laws or parts of laws in conflict herewith are
hereby repealed to the extent of the conflict. However, this Act shall not repeal or
affect any town, city or municipal ordinance which prohibits the sale and use of
fireworks within the town, city or municipal boundaries which is in effect before the
effective date of this Act, or that may be enacted after the effective date of this
Act. Provided, however, that nothing herein shall be construed to limit or restrict
the powers of cities, towns or villages as defined and delegated by Title 28, Revised
Civil Statutes of Texas, to enact ordinances prohibiting or imposing further regu-
lations on fireworks; and provided, however, that any ordinance or ordinances
heretofore enacted by any city under the authority of the above-mentioned Title
shall remain in full force and effect until thereafter amended by such city.
TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 1725, § 14 (Supp. 1967).
"TEX. CONST. art. 8, § I (emphasis added).
11TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7150, § 4 (1964).
3 See, e.g., A. & M. Consol. Ind. School Dist. v. City of Bryan, 143 Tex. 348, 184 S.W.2d
914 (1945); City of Abilene v. State, 113 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) error dismissed.
14 TEX. CONsT. art. 8, § 2 (emphasis added).
"Id. art. 11, § 9 (emphasis added).
'6415 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. 1967). For further discussion, see Harding, Contracts, this Survey,
at footnote 1.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
between the city of Beaumont and one Fertitta, under which the latter
leased city-owned property to be used by him for private commercial pur-
poses. Under one clause of the lease, the lessee agreed "that if said property
is subject to taxation by the State and County, he will pay as they accrue
all taxes assessable against said property by said State and County." In
1935, the lease was amended, and the requirement that the lessee pay any
taxes due to the State and County on the property was eliminated. One
issue, then, as stated by the Texas Supreme Court, was "whether or not
the amendment of 1935 [was] invalid because it amounted to a commu-
tation or exemption of taxes on the leasehold estate held by respondents.""'
Article 7173 of the civil statutes provides in part:
Property held under a lease for a term of three years or more, or held under
a contract for the purchase thereof, belonging to this State, or that is exempt
by law from taxation in the hands of the owner thereof, shall be considered
for all the purposes of taxation, as the property of the person so holding the
same, except as otherwise specially provided by law. s
Under article 7174, taxable leasehold estates are to be "valued at such a
price as they would bring at a fair voluntary sale for cash."'" To support
its argument that the 1935 amendment to the lease was invalid and must
be canceled, the city contended that article 7173 was applicable to the
leasehold held by Fertitta, since the property would be exempt from taxa-
tion "in the hands of the owner," the city. The Texas Supreme Court
agreed that the property in question was exempt from taxation despite the
fact that it was not being used for a public purpose and thus was not ex-
empt under article 11, section 9 of the constitution." Under article 8, sec-
tion 1 of the constitution," said the court, the legislature is authorized to
exempt all city-owned property regardless of the purpose to which it is be-
ing put, and it has exercised this authority in section 4 of article 7150.22
The court recognized that the Texas cases at least appear to impose a public
purpose requirement, but it pointed out that until now no case has actually
required an answer to the specific question of whether municipal property
not being used for a public purpose is taxable.2 As to article 8, section 2
" Id. at 907. The other major issue in the case as to whether the 1935 amendment and another
amendment made in 1933 were supported by a new and valuable consideration is not here discussed.
See id. at 906-07.
"8 Tx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7173 (1964) (emphasis added).
'"Id. art. 7174.
20 See text accompanying note 15 supra.
2 See text accompanying note 11 supra.
2 See text accompanying note 12 supra.
's In making our holding that Article 7150, Section 4, V.A.T.S., provides for the ex-
emption of municipal property regardless of the use to which it is put or the purpose
for which it is held, we are not unmindful of the fact that although a number of
cases have reached the appellate courts wherein the taxation of municipal property
has been involved, no such court has so construed said statutory provision. On the
other hand, no appellate court has ever been confronted with the question as we have
it presented to us, that is, whether or not municipal property not held or used for
public purposes is taxable. There have been cases where the property could have been
held to be exempt under Article 7150, Section 4, but the courts have found other
grounds under our constitutional and statutory provisions for exempting the property
in question in the particular case.
415 S.W.2d at 911.
1968 ]
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of the constitution," the court stated that the "public property" there
mentioned does not include municipal property but was intended to apply
to privately owned property made public in nature because of the purpose
for which it is used. Thus, that constitutional provision does not place a
public purpose requirement on municipal property as a condition for tax
exemption. Finally, the prohibition against laws exempting property other
than the property listed in article 8, section 2 of the constitution was in-
tended to apply only to that property which is required to be taxed under
article 8, section 1. City-owned property is specifically excluded from the
requirements of that section."
Three justices dissented, emphasizing that the courts in this state "have
consistently proceeded on the theory that municipal property cannot escape
taxation unless it is held or used for a public purpose," and pointing out
that if the majority view is correct, "the Texas courts have been wasting
their time all these years in considering whether municipal property was
used or held for a public purpose . . ." when they could have been "avail-
ing themselves of this easy solution ....
IV. ZONING
Despite a recommendation by the Planning and Zoning Commission that
a requested zone change be denied, the Lubbock City Council unanimously
enacted an ordinance authorizing a specific use permit for a twelve-story
apartment building in an area formerly zoned for commercial enterprises
such as bowling alleys, launderettes, movie theaters, pool halls and the
like. The private apartment project was designed primarily to serve male
students at Texas Tech, which is located across the street from one end of
the zone change area. On appeal from a judgment of the trial court hold-
ing the amending ordinance unconstitutional and invalid, a Texas court of
civil appeals reversed." Although there had been some testimony that the
24 See text accompanying note 14 supra.
" Having found that the property was "exempt by law from taxation in the hands of the
owner" under article 7173, the court nevertheless concluded that the 1935 amendment was not
invalid as amounting to a commutation of taxes on the leasehold estate. It reasoned that the origi-
nal lease provision concerning taxes did "not deal with taxes which may be assessable against the
leasehold," but only "with taxes which may be assessable against the property covered by the
lease." Accordingly, since the court had found that there was a new and valuable consideration as
to the 1935 amendment (see note 17 supra), that amendment was upheld. The court's discussion
of this point is at 415 S.W.2d at 912-13.
26415 S.W.2d at 914, where the dissenters cite A. & M. Consol. Ind. School Dist. v. City of
Bryan, 143 Tex. 348, 184 S.W.2d 914 (1945); City of Abilene v. State, 113 S.W.2d 631 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1937) error dismissed; and other cases which had been distinguished in the majority
opinion. See note 23 supra. Compare the discussion of these cases in the majority opinion, 415
S.W.2d at 911-12 with the dissent's consideration of the same cases, 415 S.W.2d at 914-15.
" City of Lubbock v. Whitacre, 414 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref. n.r.e. The
trial court had found that the action of the city council constituted "an arbitrary and unreason-
able abuse of the city's discretion ... detrimental to the private interest of the parties surrounding
the areas" and bearing "no substantial relationship to the general health, safety, morals or general
welfare of the community." Id. at 499. The opinion of the court of civil appeals is note-
worthy for bringing together and reaffirming in "1-2-3-" fashion the following principles of zoning
law:
1. 'Courts should not interfere with such actions of the city council unless it appears
that the ordinance represents a clear abuse of discretion, and an extra-ordinary
burden rests on the one attacking the ordinance . . . to show that no conclusive,
or even controversial or issuable, facts or conditions existed which would authorize
1968] MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
building of the apartment project would devalue property in the area,
other testimony indicated that the apartment would increase the value
and, in fact, that at least one lot formerly offered for $2,000 had sold for
$5,000 after word began to spread as to the possibility the apartment
might be built. This same lot had even later sold for $10,000.28 Noting
the need for additional housing for students at Texas Tech in the face of
a rapidly expanding enrollment, the additional taxes the apartment would
provide, the nature of the surrounding area,29 and the attractiveness of the
proposed apartment compared with the commercial property already in the
area, the court concluded that "reasonable minds could differ"' on the
question of whether the ordinance as amended served the interests of the
public health, safety, morals, or welfare, and thus the rezoning was not
arbitrary and unreasonable. Finally, the court distinguished Weaver v.
Hams and held that the rezoning in the instant case was not illegal "spot
zoning."'"
In another zoning case,"' a Wichita Falls ordinance prohibiting the sale
of "spirituous, vinous or malt liquors within the city's limits, except for
areas described," had been amended to provide as follows:
In recognition of the principle of non-conforming use, when an area is
annexed to the City limits of the City of 'Wichita Falls, Texas, that contains
the governing board of the municipality to exercise the discretion confided to it.'
City of Waxahachie v. Watkins, 154 Tex. 206, 275 S.W.2d 477 (1955).
2. 'The presumption of validity accorded original comprehensive zoning applies as
well to an amendatory ordinance.' City of Waxahachie v. Watkins, supra. See also
Weaver v. Ham, 149 Tex. 309, 232 S.W.2d 704 (1950); Clesi v. Northwest
Dallas Imp. Ass'n, 263 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) error ref. n.r.e.
3. 'In either case the courts have no authority to interfere unless the change is clearly
unreasonable and arbitrary.' City of Waxahachie v. Watkins, supra.
4. 'If the question is fairly debatable as to whether the zoning ordinance is arbitrary
and unreasonable and has no substantial relation to public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare, the court will not interfere.' City of Corpus Christi v. Jones, 144
S.W.2d 388, 398 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) error dismissed.
5. 'Since it is an exercise of the legislative power of the city's council, the ordinance
must be presumed to be valid.' City of Waxahachie v. Watkins, supra.
6. Whether appellees met their burden to show there were no controversial or issuable
facts which would authorize a city council to exercise its discretion in the manner
here complained of presents a question of law, not of fact, and in deciding it the
court should have due regard 'to all circumstances of the city, the object sought
to be attained and the necessity existing for the ordinance.' City of Waxahachie v.
Watkins, supra.
7. '[I]f there is an issuable fact as to whether the ordinance makes for the good
of the community, the fact that it may be detrimental to some private interest is not
material.' City of Waxahachie v. Watkins, supra, citing Edge v. City of Bellaire, 200
S.W.2d 224, 227 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) error refused (emphasis added).
414 S.W.2d at 500.
28ld. at 501.
25 The court pointed out that to the east the property is commercial for several miles. To the
west are a few residences, but just beyond them lie an apartment project, a hospital, and parking
lots. See id. at 501.
aId. at 502.
as 149 Tex. 309, 232 S.W.2d 704 (1950).
"In Weaver v. Ham, 149 Tex. 309, 232 S.W.2d 704 (1950), a lot 150 by 300 feet surrounded
by residences had been rezoned commercial. The court stressed that in the instant case a great deal
of the property in the area of the zone change was already commercial, and it added: "there is
not shown by the facts in that case [Weaver] as valid a necessity existing for the zone change as
in our case, 'all the circumstances of the city, the object sought to be attained' being considered."
414 S.W.2d at 502.
'City of Wichita Falls v. Evans, 410 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
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businesses which have been operating in said area for a period of no less than
12 months ... those businesses which have existed for such period of time
shall be allowed to continue in the same location.4
A liquor store being operated within the provisions of the amended ordi-
nance was located on a lot in such a position that a completely new build-
ing could be constructed on the same lot without first removing the exist-
ing building. While the new building was under construction, the business
continued to operate in the other; there was no break in carrying on the
business upon completion of the new building and transfer of the goods
to that building followed by removal of the old building from the lot.
The new structure was somewhat larger than the old and was situated ap-
proximately a foot from the site of the old building. A Texas court of
civil appeals held that the business was being conducted in the "same loca-
tion" within the meaning of the amended ordinance. As to the question of
enlargement of the non-conforming use, the court declared that if there
was an enlargement, it was only "in the amount of business transacted"
which "is not a proper subject of zoning ordinances" and was not covered
under the ordinance in question.'
V. SPECIAL ASSESSMENTs-NOTICE TO LANDOWNERS
In City of Houston v. Fore" the Texas Supreme Court considered sec-
tion 9 of article 110 5b, which formerly allowed notice to property owners
as to hearings on the assessment of costs for street improvements to be
"by advertisement inserted at least three (3) times in some newspaper
published in the city where such special assessment tax is to be imposed
. . ,,"t After enacting an ordinance approving an estimate of costs and a
proposed rate of assessment for certain planned improvements on Delz
Street in Houston, the city council of that city caused notice to be pub-
lished in full accord with the above cited provision of article 1105b. How-
ever, the evidence showed that Fore, who owned abutting property on Delz
Street, did not read the advertisement, did not in fact have any knowledge
of the hearings, had lived on Delz Street for twenty-four years, and had
previously received correspondence from the city at his Delz Street ad-
dress, which was on the tax rolls. In the city's suit to recover the amount
of two paving assessments and to foreclose the lien thereof, the jury re-
14 Id. at 313, citing amendment to Wichita Falls City Ordinance No. 1416 (emphasis in
original).
MId. at 314.
36412 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. 1967). For further discussion, see FitzGerald, Administrative Law,
this Survey, at footnote 1.37TEx. Rpv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1105b, S 9 (1963). The full text of that portion of the
statute which was applicable in this case is as follows:
Sec. 9. No assessment herein provided for shall be made against any abutting
property or its owners ...until after notice and opportunity for hearing as herein
provided, and no assessment shall be made against any abutting property or owners
thereof in excess of the special benefits of such property, and its owners in the en-
hanced value thereof by means of such improvements as determined at such hearing.
Such notice shall be by advertisement inserted at least three (3) times in some
newspaper published in the city where such special assessment tax is to be imposed,
if there be such a paper; if not, then the nearest to such city of general circulation
in the county in which such city is located.
See note 48 infra and accompanying text for the 1967 amendment of this section.
[Vol. 22
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turned a verdict for the city, but the trial court sustained the property
owner's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and this was
upheld by a Texas court of civil appeals."8 The Texas Supreme Court af-
firmed and held that, as to this particular property owner, the notice pro-
visions of article 110 5b failed to satisfy due process requirements under the
fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. While
acknowledging that notice by publication such as prescribed in article
1105b has generally been thought to meet the due process requirements,"9
the court relied on a series of cases decided by the United States Supreme
Court to the effect that such notice falls short of due process where names
and addresses are known to the city.'
One of the leading authorities on municipal corporation law has stated:
Constructive notice was once thought adequate to support special assess-
ment proceedings. Nevertheless, publication notice alone is inadequate and
acutely unfair to the property owner. Notice by mail to the last known ad-
dress of the owner should always be added, and the courts can well become
more realistic about what is reasonably calculated to apprise the owner of the
land that he will be subjected to assessment.4
This "more realistic" attitude now required by the Texas Supreme Court
concerning special assessment proceedings had its genesis in a United
States Supreme Court case involving notice by publication to beneficiaries
of a common trust fund that the trust company was petitioning for ju-
dicial settlement of its accounts. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &q
Trust Co." the Supreme Court held that such notice was insufficient "as
to known present beneficiaries of known place of residence. '
In Walker v. City of Hutchinson" the United States Supreme Court
cited Mullane and held that the principle enunciated in that case was also
applicable to condemnation proceedings.
One week after the Walker decision, the Supreme Court entered an
order in the case of Wisconsin Electric Power Company v. City of Mil-
waukee,"' in which the constitutionality of notice by publication with re-
gard to special assessment proceedings was in issue. The Supreme Court's
order remanded the case for consideration in light of the Walker case,
and on the remand the Wisconsin Supreme Court, citing Mullane and
Walker, held that "the constructive notice given by the defendant city by
publication of the proposed special assessments against the plaintiff's lands
did not meet the requirements of due process."
38 City of Houston v. Fore, 401 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), aff'd, 412 S.W.2d 35
(1967).
"'See the Texas cases cited by the court in the instant case at 412 S.W.2d at 38 and cases cited
at 2 C. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW S 14.13 n.11 (1967).
" Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 352 U.S. 948 (1956); Walker v. City of
Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306
(1950).
412 C. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 14.13 (1967).
42339 U.S. 306 (1950).
'Id. at 318.
44352 U.S. 112 (1956).
45352 U.S. 948 (1956), amended, 352 U.S. 958 (1957).




After tracing the development of the Mullane doctrine as set out above,
the Texas Supreme Court properly concluded that, since in the instant
case the landowner's "name and address were known to the city, and he
could have been readily notified by mail . . . the publication did not con-
stitute adequate notice to respondent.
4 7
As a result of this decision, section 9 of article 1105b was subseqently
amended by adding a requirement that fourteen days written notice of
hearings be mailed to the addresses shown on current tax rolls of the
city." Query whether the principles enunciated in the Fore case may in
the future be applied in other areas, e.g., hearings relating to petitions for
changes and amendments to zoning ordinances."
VI. PUBLIC UTILITIES AND SERVICES
A Texas court of civil appeals stated "We think not" in answer to the
question of whether there had been a taking of property without due
process of law in Johnson v. Benbrook Water & Sewer Authority.' At
issue was a policy requirement by a sewer and water authority that all
builders, subdividers, and developers pay the entire cost of extending
water and sewer service into new areas. Upon completion of the work,
title to the extension was to vest in the Authority, and all maintenance
and replacement costs would thereafter be borne by the Authority. It was
established that the subdivider had previously obtained extensions of
water and sewer service into a number of other developments within the
Authority's boundaries under the same conditions now challenged. It was
further shown that he had recovered in the sale price of tracts already
sold a "pro rata share of the total cost ... allocable to each of said tracts,"
and he testified that the remaining cost would be recovered upon sale of
all tracts within the development.5' The court supported its terse opinion
by citing another civil appeals case holding that a city's annexation of a
subdivision, including sewer lines which had been recently installed at the
expense of the developer, did not amount to a taking of property without
just compensation. '
VII. TORT LIABILITY
In Ramundo v. City of San Antonio" the plaintiff was injured when
4 City of Houston v. Fore, 412 S.W.2d 35, 39 (Tex. 1967).
48 [A]dditional written notice of the hearing shall be given by depositing in the
United States mail, at least fourteen (14) days before the date of the hearing, written
notice of such hearing, postage prepaid, in an envelope addressed to the owners of
the respective properties abutting such highway, highways or portion or portions
thereof to be improved, as the names of such owners are shown on the then current
rendered tax rolls of the city at the addresses so shown ....
TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. ll0Sb, S 9 (Supp. 1967).
49 See, e.g., 3 DALLAS, TEXAS, REV. CIv. & CRIM. CODE §§ 32-102, 32-103 (1965), where
written notice is required to all owners of real property lying within 200 feet of the property on
which the change is requested, but notice by publication only is required as to all other interested
property owners.
50410 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
5 Id. at 646.
" See City of Snyder v. Bass, 360 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) error ref. n.r.e.
5s416 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. 1967).
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a city bus on which he was riding stopped suddenly, causing him to be
thrown to the floor of the bus. As a prerequisite to any liability by the
city, the San Antonio City Charter requires that written notice-to be
filed with the city within ninety days after personal injuries have been sus-
tained-must include, among other things, a statement of "when, where
and how" the injuries were suffered. In this case, the plaintiff filed timely
notice, stating that his injuries were caused by the negligence of the bus
driver in abruptly stopping the bus. At the trial the city asserted in an
amended answer that a policeman on a motorcycle had stopped suddenly
in front of the bus making it necessary for the bus driver to come to the
stop that caused the plaintiff's fall. Judgment at the trial level was for
the plaintiff and was based on the jury's findings that the conduct of the
policeman and not of the bus driver was the proximate cause of the plain-
tiff's injuries. A Texas court of civil appeals, one justice dissenting, re-
versed on the ground that the plaintiff's notice failed to meet the charter
requirements. The variance between the plaintiff's notice and the proof
adduced at trial, said the court, was such that "plaintiff is now seeking to
support a judgment based on a cause of action to which a particular de-
fense might have been successfully interposed had the municipality been
reasonably alerted to the nature of plaintiff's claim, while the notice to the
city described a claim based on facts setting forth a cause of action to
which the omitted defense was not applicable.""a4 In this regard, it should
be noted that the city did not initially plead the doctrine of governmental
immunity and was not allowed by the trial court to amend its pleadings
and interpose this defense at the conclusion of the evidence.
The Texas Supreme Court refused application for writ of error, but
in a per curiain opinion it rejected without reasons the rationale of the
court of civil appeals. It held instead that there could be no recovery be-
cause "all of the issues upon which Petitioner relied for recovery were
found against him," and recovery was based on findings resulting from
a defensive issue raised by the city."s The exact reason for the supreme
court's disagreement with the rationale of the majority opinion of the
court of civil appeals cannot, of course, be known. The civil appeals
opinion relies heavily on the traditional but unworkable governmen-
tal/proprietary theory of municipal tort liability in concluding that the
variance between notice and proof at trial was fatal in this case."' There
" City of San Antonio v. Ramundo, 411 S.W.2d 428, 432 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref.
,s.r.e.
5s Ramundo v. City of San Antonio, 416 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. 1967). The supreme court cited
as the basis for its rationale TEX. R. Civ. P. 279.
It must be assumed . . . that a Texas municipal attorney, when confronted with a
claim based on the asserted negligence of a city policeman, would not, in protecting
the interests of his client, ignore the defense of governmental immunity. The City's
failure to plead such defense in this case, as well as its failure to come forward with
the proof necessary to support it, is not surprising in view of the fact that plaintiff's
notice, as well as his pleadings, asserted a claim not subject to such defense. Plaintiff
now seeks to recover on a cause of action which the City, relying on his notice, was
not prepared to, and did not, defend. Under these circumstances, the variance must
be held to be fatal.
City of San Antonio v. Ramundo, 411 S.W.2d 428, 431 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref.
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have been hints in the past that the Texas Supreme Court may be becom-
ing disenchanted with this troublesome doctrine." However, it is likely
that the court in the instant case merely felt that the plaintiff's notice did
meet the requirements of the city charter, since it did state to the best of
his knowledge at that time how his injuries were sustained.
There were few cases of compelling significance in the municipal cor-
poration field during the survey period. Attention has here been focused
upon those decisions which are felt to be either of some lasting importance
or, hopefully, of more than passing interest.
"ISee Dancer v. City of Houston, 384 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1964); City of Austin v. Daniels,
335 S.W.2d 753 (Tex. 1960); Crow v. City of San Antonio, 301 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. 1957).
But see the discussion in last year's Survey article, Webster & FitzGerald, Municipal Corporations,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 21 Sw. L.J. 221, 229-30 (1967).
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